Introduction
Civil s ociety organisations participateas representatives of a range of socialgroups, values and interests in the participatory budget and deliberativepolicy councils in the city of SãoPaulo, Brazil. This participation is significant,bothin terms of numbers of organisations and in terms of organisations'assessment of the valueofparticipation. Inour study of civil society organisations who work withor for the urbanpoor and working class,59 per cent had some formofparticipation and the vast majority of those who participate stated that doing so was very important or indispensable. One of the questions this poses is how do organisations that participatediffer from those that do not and, what increases the likelihood of participation?
Organisations'differentialcapacity toparticipate has remained hidden in s tudies of citizen participation. Most studies on participation share acivil society perspective that makes few analytic distinctions within civil society and pays little attention tofactors, suchas institutions, that shape actors'differentialcapacities for action. Most work, for example,does not distinguish,empirically or at the level of theory,between the participation of individualcitizens and that of civil society organisations.
1 Yet the twoobey quitedistinct logics; individuals and organisations haved ifferent capacities for action (including participation) and thesecapacities arelikely tobe shaped by different constellations of factors.In this article we therefore suggest apolity perspectiveo ncivil society participation that is sensitive to the differential capacity for action and toinstitutionaleffects.
The dispersed and heterogeneous natureof citizen participation,its relative youthinmany parts of the world and the particular epistemologicaland historicalorigins of the debateoncivil society and participation,has meant that the stateofknowledge in this areain fact lags behind the concrete experimentation that is being undertaken. Most empirical researchhas taken the formofcase studies of particular experiments or of particular civil society organisations. 2 Tod raw conclusions that are reasonable across diversecontexts,analysts have had toengage in forms of comparativeanecdotalism, that is,idiosyncraticcases from different contexts areherded together intoa single explanation or generalisation. Furthermore,most studies select on the dependent variable, that is, they focus on actors who areparticipating,making it impossible tocompare the characteristics and strategies of actors who areinparticipatory spaces with those who have stayed out of them.
This article is based on a unique survey of 229 civil society organisations that work withor for people in low-middle class, working class and poor neighbourhoods to solveindividualand collective problems and/or top rovide some degree of representation vis-à-vis government in SãoPaulo (municipality,population 10 million). The survey sought toidentify factors that increase the propensity of suchactors toe ngage withp olicy-making participatory institutions.It used modified snowball sampling tom eet the challenges posed by the diverseand dispersed natureofcivil society actors. Itgenerated a representative sample of civil society actors that are moreactive and hence,most likely toenter and use the three types of participatory policy-making institutions in SãoPaulo: the participatory budget,deliberativepolicy councils and anaggregate type of all forms of participation in policy-making institutions.
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The findings support the claims that,in the case of SãoPaulo, therearepowerfulinstitutionaleffects on the participation of civil society organisations. The best predictor of whether ano rganisation participates,in any of the three types of spaces,is the presenceof relations to traditionalinstitutional actors: the Workers'Party or the State,and the design of the institutions.The organisationalform actors take,in terms of a typology of organisations developed in the article,alsohas a significant impact on who participates.What wecall advocacy nongovernmentalorganisations (NGOs)areless likely toparticipate thancommunity associations and coordinators.Incontrast, the wealtho fan organisation does not influenceparticipation,nor do the issue-areas in whichanactor works,nor how it works.
Perspectives on civil society participation
Theorising in this areahas hardly begunbut it is possible to speakofa"civil society"and a"polity" perspectiveonparticipation. These twoperspectives point todifferent constellations of factors that shape collectiveaction suchas participation.
The civil society perspective, shared by the literatures on civil society,deliberativedemocracy and empowered participation,holds the assumption that it is relatively unproblematicfor individualor collectiveactors to reachand useinstitutional arrangements for citizen participation. 4 The core of the perspectiveis adichotomous reading of the relations between state(authoritarian), whichfor some includes politicalp arties,a nd society (democratic). The conviction that authenticcivil society actors areademocratising and rationalising forceofpublicaction becauseof their deliberative logic(versus interest-based),decentralised nature and rootedness in the sociallife of localcommunities and autonomy (for most people,from the spheres of the state,politicalparties and interest groups politics).
5 Thesefeatures,it is believed,givecivil society aparticular democratising logic that contrasts favourably to that of the interest-based logicof r epresentativebodies, t he t echnobureaucraticlogicof stateagencies and the exclusionary logicof the market.It is anarticle of faithin the civil society perspective that citizen participationincreases the opportunity toinfluence policies for lower income and other excluded populations, whoseinterests aremarginalised in classic representativeinstitutions. 6 The polity perspective suggests that participation is acontingent outcome,produced as collective actors (civil society, stateand other)n egotiate relations in apre-existing institutional terrain that constrains and facilitates particular kinds of action.
7
Whereas the civil society perspectivehas paid little attention to sociologically realactors and political institutions, the polity perspectiveis foremost concerned with the historicaland comparative analysis of institutionally situated actors.In this theoreticalcontext, the notion of institutionally embedded actors suggests that it is thoseactors who have ties toinstitutionalpoliticalactors; in the context of Brazil,it is politicalp arties, union movements,certain organised religious groups and the state that have the capacity to reachand engage the new institutions for citizen participation.
What is participation?
Thereh as been a remarkable proliferation of institutionalised participatory arrangements throughout Brazil and at all levels of the state (municipal, stateand federal). In the city of São Paulo,a veritable institutionaljungle has emerged, populated by diverse( along every dimension imaginable) t ypes of institutions for direct participation. Ineachof theseinstitutions, there aremultiple ways in whichactors canparticipate. This article focuses on the most cited arrangements in the SãoPaulo survey: the participatory budget , the deliberative policy councils and a thirdcategory wecall all institutionalforms of participation.
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Organisations canparticipateindifferent ways. The new participatory institutions wereintentionally designed toinclude civil society and,in some cases individualcitizens,in the different moments of publicdecision making and action; in the design of policy and regulation,in supervising or monitoring implementation and even in the implementation of policy or management of programmes.In the councils,for example,it is possible tobea sitting member of the council,a recipient of financing from acouncil-managed fund, or aparticipant in publichearings held by the council. Although in the caseof suchparticipation in councils, weare relatively sure that actors would haveindicated participation if they were sitting 
Policy-Areaplenaries
Ineachof the 5plenaries,delegates elect 2 councillors toCONOP.
Preparatory Policy-Areaassemblies
Municipalgovernment presents its programmes and policy priorities to participants.
CONOP
Council of the Participatory Budget: takes the decisions by the Assemblies to the Administration and oversees theirimplementation,negotiating solutions to technicalproblems where they arise; it alsodecided with the Administration on the structureof the budget process.
Territorialplenaries
Ineachof 28 regionalplenaries, delegates elect 2 councillors to CONOP, who will define review projects received from eachof the 28administrativedistricts and decide which will beimplemented.
TerritorialCycle Preparatory Territorialassemblies
Municipalgovernment presents information on the region's situation. Participants then decide what will be the thirdissuearea, after the mandatory healthand education,for whichprojects will beproposed.
Territorialassemblies
Deliberation: Participants present and define expenditures withabudget for the region,in eachof the 3 areas and elect Territorialdelegates.96 Assemblies are held,one for eachdistrict of the city.
CONOP Composition
q 10 Policy-Areacouncillors and 56 Territorialcouncillors q 14 councillors appointed by the municipalgovernment q 8councillors representing, respectively: women,Blacks, street people, the disabled,children and adolescents,GLBT (Gay,Lesbian,Bisexualand Transgender)and Indians q 4councillors chosen by, respectively, the MunicipalHealth,Housing,Rights of the Child and the Adolescent and SocialServices Councils Policy-AreaCycle members of the council,for the purposes of this article, the important point is that theseforms of participationareo rganised in institutionally predefined mechanisms. The participatory budget is the best known experiment in the democratisation of publicpolicy in Brazil.
9 InSãoPaulo, the budgeting process is currently in its second year.In 2002, the spending priorities of approximately a thirdof the municipal budget for publicinvestment,or 12 per cent of the totalmunicipalbudget, were set in the participatory budgeting process.The municipaladministration estimates that 55,000 people participated in that year's budgeting exercise ( SãoPaulo 2003) . Participation is complex and occurs at several distinctivemoments and spaces.The process has twocycles:aPolicy-AreaCycle and aT erritorial Cycle (see Figure1),eachof whichappear tohave been designed tof avour the participation of distinctiveactors.The Policy-AreaCycle starts with assemblies in nine macro-regions of the city, where, after the municipaladministration' s Secretariats present their projects and programmes to participants, the assembly defines the priorities for the next year and elects policy-areadelegates to Policy-Areaplenaries.The TerritorialCycle follows a similar process,but withafew notable differences when it comes to the breadthofcitizen participation and the types of demands participants areallowed tomake. The preparatory assemblies occur in 270 small Territorialdivisions that cover theentirecity and the deliberativeassemblies areo rganised according to the city' s 96 administrativedistricts.
Deliberativepolicy councils arepart of abaroque universeo fp articipatory spaces withd istinct mandates and organisationalfeatures.This universe canbedivided intofour categories:deliberative policy councils,programme councils,policy-area councils and public unit and autarky councils.The policy councils fit most closely with the widely held image of deliberativeparticipatory spaces and they have the highest levels of participation of the councils within our sample. 10 They arefederally mandated by the 1988 Constitution and are organised in afederated structure that parallels that of the government,in policy areas that the Constitution itself defines as high priority.They are, therefore,institutions whosecreation and areas of competence,in addition to the forms of civil society participation,arelegally mandated and guaranteed. They provide equal representation to civil s ociety actors,publica uthorities and professionalassociations involved in the relevant policy area.The number of seats each sector receives is determined by specificenacting legislation or by the Council' s internal statutes, the content of which is ratified by newly elected councillors at the beginning of their term.
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The variable all institutionalforms of participation includes,in addition,amix of different institutionalised forms of citizen participation that link societaland stateactors tofacilitateconsultation, regulation,or the design or implementation of publicpolicy.Theseforms range from programme councils and publicinfrastructurecouncils, to working groups,committees and commissions,as well as the tutelary councils whichattend the public on issues related to the rights of the child and adolescent.
Who participates?
Inour sample of moreactiveorganisations,135of 229collectiveactors,or 59 per cent,participatein some kind of policy participatory space, 33 per cent in the participatory budget and 34in the deliberative policy councils.
12 Participation is substantial. Richand poor organisations,defined by budget size,participateat about similar rates.This finding gives strong support to the hypothesis that the new participatory institutions createopportunities for socialgroups excluded from other publicdecisionmaking arenas.This is a significant finding with potentialimplications for democratic theory and for policymaking. Potential,because the finding cannot shed light on how responsiveparticipating actors are to the groups they claim to workfor or represent.Shedding light on this responsiveness will requireadifferent researchdesign and further conceptual workonformsof responsiveness and representation.
Thereis strong support for the idea that actors who are institutionally embedded haveahigher propensity toparticipate. Statisticalmodels help to specify that the ties that matter in the caseofSão Paulo are to the Worker' s Party or to the government viacontracts todeliver services.Having such ties, together withbeing either coordinators or an association,are the best predictors of participation in all three types of participatory spaces.Ties to the twoother large institutionalactors in Brazil, unions and t he CatholicC hurch,did not affect participation. 13 The findings do not imply that institutionally embedded actors lackautonomy, but rather that the results consistently point to the analyticcost of placing too muchemphasis on civil society autonomy.
Whichcivil society organisations?
Exploring whether the organisationalformand substantiveconcerns of civil society actors influence participation requires a typology of civil society actors.The categories used in existing typologies, suchas those that distinguishbetween NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs)and social movements,areoflimited use. The ambiguous use of the category NGO in the social sciences is mirrored in civil society.Over 40 per cent of the actors in the sample identified themselves as NGOs, but these self-proclaimed NGOs wereanextremely diversegroup. Many actors appear to use the label "NGO"for the purposes of public self-representation and the concept has lost what little analyticcontent it might havehad. We thereforecreated a typology tocapture diversity of civil society organisations, that is, those that do not haveas their primary concern accumulation of material wealthor exercising public authority.It is based on twodimensions:how actors work( the type of activities in which they are engaged) and the natureof their relation to their stated members/beneficiaries. Table 1provides further information on the five types identified in the sample:advocacy non-governmentalorganisations (ANGOs),A ssociations (ASSN),C oordinators (COORD),S erviceNon-Profit (SERVNP)and Others (OTHER). Organisationalformhas a significant influence on participation. The three models identify important differences in the levels and forms of participation of different types of collectiveactors.This confirms that the categories of civil society actors in the typology captureimportant distinctions that,among other things,influenceparticipation. The three models do not support anarrow focus on ANGOs as the principalparticipatory agents; ANGOs areno morelikely toparticipate thannon-ANGOs.Instead, they show that localassociations and coordinators have substantially higher propensities toparticipate. Inaddition, the models identify adivision of labour between associations and coordinators when controlled by two strong factors: relations to the Workers'Party (PT)and government through the servicedelivery contracts.Associations participate at high levels in the participatory budget and at much lower levels in the policy councils.Coordinators participateat high levels in the councils and at lower levels (including lower thanassociations)i n budgeting. Incontrast,localassociations and coordinators participateat far higher rates.
Disaggregating civil society actors into the five categories of the typology alsomakes it possible to identify whether anactor' s relations toother civil society actors influences participation. Being a coordinator is the strongest indicator for participation in acouncil (nearly six times morelikely thannoncoordinators), yet having relations with suchbodies makes it far less likely that anactor will participate. The explanation for this inverse relationship between participationincouncils and ties tocoordinators may lie on the one hand,in the limited number of seats available on councilsand on the other,in adivision of labour amongst civil society actors in which the seats areinlarge measureoccupied by coordinators. Associations with ties tocoordinators would therefore tend not toparticipate. This interpretation has some support from the fact that coordinators haveinlarge measurebeen created by other civil society actors, particularly advocacy NGOs, whichdonot havea significant participation in the councils.
Design of participatory institutions
The design of participatory institutions, that is, the specification of their legalmandate,formalcriteria and procedures for participation,physical distribution of spaces for participation,etc.,also appears toinfluence who participates.Design effects are statistically significant.Their interpretation is complicated,however,by evidenceof"interaction effects", that is, the influenceo fd esign varies according to the type of actor.
14 Coordinators have far higher participation rates in councils than they do in the participatory budget, while associations have the reversepattern. In the participatory budget, the design of the electoralprocesses through which spending priorities aredetermined and delegates elected to the budget council generally favours actors with territorially or community-based roots (e.g. ASSN). Councils,in contrast,aremunicipalwide bodies and territoriality is not afactor in selecting civil society participants.
The impactof institutionaldesign should also beapparent when welook at the issueareas in whichactors work. Policy councils,as well as the other kinds of councils and institutions,have authority toact in particular policy areas (health, education,housing,etc.), while the participatory budget,in its territorialcycle,mandates that spending decisions have tobemade in healthand education,in addition toareas the participants choose toaddress.Surprisingly, the models do not show any evidence that the issueareas in which actors workaffect the propensity toparticipate, including in policy councils.Thereis one interesting exception,discussed below.
In the caseof the policy councils,it is very likely that the lackof statistically significant results is related to the small number of actors who participate in any one council. When all policy councils are taken together, the number of participating actors in the sample is substantial,but when disaggregating by individualcouncils the statistical results arenot significant.
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The participatory budget provides amore interesting result.Actors who havehealthas one of the primary areas are significantly morelikely thanother actors toparticipate. This may bebest explained by the fact that healthis one of two mandatory issueareas in the participatory budget and hence thereareinstitutionalmechanisms and incentives that encourage participation in this area. The importanceofinstitutionaldesign receives some support from this finding. The other mandatory policy areain the budgeting process, education,does not stimulate similar participation. Institutionaldesign thereforecannot be the entire explanation. It is likely that the vitality and long history of SãoPaulo' s healthmovement, whichhas long played a substantialpolitical role,including in the 1980s transition politics,is alsoanimportant factor in explaining why actors working in health haveahigher propensity toparticipate. Incontrast, the "education movement"is poorly organised and many of the organisations involved in educational issues also workinother issueareas.Taken together, institutionalincentives toparticipation and civil society actors'capacity for action offer a reasonable explanation for why healthis anexceptionalcase.
Other factors
The processes leading up to the foundation of these institutions,and specifically who was involved in creating them, was not found tohaveaneffect on participation within them. This suggests that pathdependence, rooted in the foundationalmoment does not exerciseaninfluenceon the propensity to participate; actors constituted prior to t he democratic transition period or after it areas likely toparticipateas those who wereformed during the period of politicaland institutionalf lux that characterises transitions.
Wed id find t hat actors who engage in mobilisationalpolitics (protests and demonstrations) areconsiderably morelikely tobeinvolved in the participatory budget.This finding is consistent with arguments in the socialmovement literature that groups who engage in extra-institutionalactivity areoften alsoinvolved in institutionalised channels of politics (McAdam et al. 2002) . The result runs counter,however, to the arguments frequently voiced in the publicarena that groups involved in protest areeither marginalised people acting out frustrationsor irrational(and destructive) impulses, or aremarauding gangs of anti-socialelements.This second type of argument aims tocriminaliseprotest activity and, thereby,legitimisea state response that is primarily coercive.
Finally, thereis apositive relationship between involvement in civil society foraand in policy councils.In the sample,a significant number of civil society actors participated in both. One possible explanation for this patternis that foraprovide an institutional setting in whichcivil society actors candeliberateand reachcommon positions prior toengaging with stateagents in formal(legally defined) deliberative spaces.This suggests there may bea relation between the creation of institutions for participation in policy making and the creation of civil society fora.
Conclusion
The findings leavelittle doubt that civil society organisations vary in their capacity toparticipate and that toidentify and theorise this variation, we need anapproach that is sensitive to the effects of (1) politicalinstitutions,(2)organisationalformof actors,and (3)design of participatory spaces. Fung and Wright' s 'empowered participation' (2003) has made important advances on the last of these three components.Yet this approach would not reveal to us the importanceofinstitutionalembeddedness for participation,nor that of the organisationalform organisations take. We suggest that amovefrom a broadly civil society perspective toapolity perspectivecanalso shed light on the former two. 3.Snowball techniques use"chain referrals" tobuild up samples that arepurposefully targeted and hencenot random. They arebest suited for reaching difficult-toaccess populations,or toidentify populations that remain invisible when using other sampling techniques.We started the snowball at 20 different entry points, which were selected using four distinctive sources and were distributed evenly across four distinct lower-income regions of the city.
4. Oncivil society, see Keane (1992) ; Costa(1994 and 1999) ; Dagnino (2003) ; on deliberativedemocracy, see Avritzer (1998 and , Elster (1997) and Cohen (1998) ; and on empowered participation, see the essays in Fung and Wright (2003) and Fung,forthcoming.
5. See Keane (1992) ; Cohen and Arato(1992) ; Costa(1994 and 1999); UNDP (2002) . Thesefeatures arepart of a turn-of-the-century polycentric zeitgeist that appears to haveaparticular hostility towardl arge political organisations,be they stateentities,politicalparties,or supra-localorganised groups suchas labour movements and professionalassociations (Houtzager 2003 8. The advantage of the last category, whichincludes within it the first two,is alarge statistical universe with which to workand the ability toinclude in the analysis adiverse grouping of participatory spaces that are rarely studied.
9. One estimateplaces the number of municipalities that undertake some formofparticipatory budgeting at around 150.Depending on definitions of participatory budgeting, however, that number could be significantly smaller.As agrowing number of politicalgroupings, withhighly variable politicaland administrativepractices,claim to beengaged in suchbudgeting exercises, thereis anew discussion about where the conceptualboundaries should bedrawn.
10.Among policy councils, the municipal, stateand national HealthCouncils and the Council for the Rights of the Child and Adolescent (Conselho dos Direitos daCriança edoAdolescente,DCA),created in 1991 and 1992, respectively,have the highest participation rates.
11. Furthermore,in most cases the number of seats for civil society actors is legally specified and in afew instances even the actualactors are specified.
12.The statistical techniques used in this section are appropriatefor dichotomous variables: univariate relative risk ratios and multivariatelogistic regressions.
13.Although a substantial shareofactors in the sample did have relations withlabour unions or sectors of the Catholic Church,bothclose to40 per cent of the sample,none of the statisticalexercises show any effect of these relations on the propensity toparticipate. ResearchonEvangelical churches (non-traditionalProtestant churches), suggests that they tend tod epoliticiseand demobilise their members,henceactors with relations to suchgroups might havelower propensities toparticipate. The dataset does not contain enough cases of actors with such relations to test this hypothesis.
14. The significancelevel for the type of organisation varies across the three types of participatory institutional arrangements.
15. Thereis anexception when housing is one of the two principalissueareas in whichanactor works.In such cases, thereis aninverse relation toparticipation. This could beexplained by,on the one hand,alarge number of actors involved in housing issues and,on the other, the housing council' s inactivity.
